The continuous-variable quantum key distribution with entanglement in the middle, a semi-deviceindependent protocol, places the source in the untrusted third party between Alice and Bob, and thus has the advantage of high levels of security with the purpose of eliminating the assumptions about the source device. However, previous works considered the collective-attack analysis, which inevitably assumes that the states of the source has an identical and independently distributed (i.i.d) structure, and limits the application of the protocol. To solve this problem, we modify the original protocol by exploiting an energy test to monitor the potential high energy attacks an adversary may use. Our analysis removes the assumptions of the light source and the modified protocol can therefore be called source-device-independent protocol. Moreover, we analyze the security of the continuousvariable source-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with a homodyne-homodyne structure against general coherent attacks by adapting a state-independent entropic uncertainty relation. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security framework, the protocol can still achieve high key rates against coherent attacks under the condition of achievable block lengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] , as one of the most practical quantum cryptography technology, allows two users (traditionally called Alice and Bob) to establish a set of secret keys exploiting both quantum mechanics and classical post-processing methods. This can provide information-theoretic security even against existing potential eavesdroppers.
Continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocol [3, 4] , of which the characteristic is that the information is encoded on the quadratures of the light field and measured with coherent measurement methods, e.g., homodyne [5] and heterodyne detection [6] , has developed rapidly. There are two main reasons resulting in CV-QKD attracting so much attention in recent years: it can be easily implemented with standard telecom components and compatible with wavelength division multiplexing [7, 8] , and it can achieve high key rate in metropolitan distance [9] , which has advantages of shortrange implementation.
There are plenty of CV-QKD protocols proposed to deal with different scenarios. In the case of fully trusteddevice protocols, it is always assumed that both Alice and Bob are honest, and Eve can only control the quantum channels rather than the devices at the two parties. A large number of distinctive trusted-device protocols, including discrete modulation CV-QKD protocols [10] [11] [12] , two-way protocols [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] and so forth, have been put * hongguo@pku.edu.cn forward to enrich the protocol design. However, because of the imperfection of the practical source and detection devices, a QKD system may be attacked by an potential eavesdropper, and it compromise the security of a protocol [19] . To eliminate all the loopholes of devices, fully device-independent protocols are proposed, which do not make any assumptions for all experimental devices and allows Eve to control them all . Nevertheless, those protocols face experimental challenges because they have to perform a detection-loophole-free Bell test [20] .
As a compromise, semi-device-independent (semi-DI) protocols are proposed, such as measurementdevice-independent (MDI) [21] [22] [23] and one-sided deviceindependent (1sDI) [24, 25] QKD protocols, to give a trade off between the security of some devices and the performance of a protocol, which regard that part of the protocol is honest and the other part is untrusted. Remarkably, both CV-MDI [26] [27] [28] and CV-1sDI protocols [24, 29, 30] have been analyzed against general coherent attacks, which improves the security analysis of the protocols.
CV-QKD with entanglement in the middle [31] is the protocol of which the source is placed with the untrusted third party in the middle and controlled by the malicious eavesdropper. Alice and Bob then measure one of the modes they received separately, with either homodyne or heterodyne detection. The goal of the protocol is that we do not need to give assumptions on the source, which is sometimes ill-characterised and unsafe in communication. Nevertheless, the security analysis of the CV-QKD with entanglement in the middle protocol is only confined to the collective attack cases, which inevitably assumes that the states of the source has identical and independently distributed (i.i.d) structure, i.e., ρ A n B n = σ ⊗n AB , leading to the protocol not being able to reach the original idea of source-device-independent (SDI).
Inspired by the security analysis technique used in the 1sDI protocol by F. Furrer et al. [29, 30] , we adapt one type of state-independent entropic uncertainty relation with CVs to analyse the security of the CV-QKD with entanglement in the middle protocol under coherent attacks and only consider the case that both Alice and Bob perform homodyne detections. We modify the original protocol by exploiting an energy test at the reconciliation side (Bob's side for reverse reconciliation as an example) to monitor the potential high energy attacks an adversary may use. By properly quantifying the correlation between Alice's and Bob's data, which could be used for estimating Eve's knowledge of the raw key, we obtain the secret key rate of a finite number of exchanged signals supposing that the strategy Eve exploiting is a coherent attack. Our analysis removes the assumptions of the light source and assumes that the sampling process performed in Alice's and Bob's sides are i.i.d, which is needed for exploiting the entropic uncertainty relation. Therefore, The modified protocol can be called CV-SDI QKD protocol. Finally, simulation shows that even when the coherent attack is considered, CV-QKD with entanglement in the middle can still reach a non-zero key rate over short distance, without giving any constrains of the source.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we give a short description on the definition of composable security in QKD. In Sec. III, we give an introduction of the original CV-QKD protocol with entanglement in the middle under collective attacks. In Sec. IV, we exploit a version of state-independent entropic uncertainty relation to analyse the security of the modified CV-SDI QKD protocol against coherent attacks. Then, in Sec. V, we present the simulation results of the secret key rates in both the collective and coherent attack cases. Finally, we summarize the paper in Sec. VI.
II. COMPOSABLE SECURITY DEFINITION
A detailed discussion of the composability in quantum cryptography can be seen in Ref. [32] . For better understanding of the security criteria in QKD, we first need to know what is perfectly secure for a QKD protocol. A perfectly secure QKD protocol should satisfy three criteria: correctness, secrecy and robustness [32] .
We denote S A is the key in Alice's side and S B is the key in Bob's side. Correctness requires that every key outputted from Alice and Bob's side is identical, namely S A = S B = S. Secrecy means that the output key S is uniformly distributed and independent of Eve's auxiliary systems, and the classical-quantum (cq) state of S and E can be described as ρ sE = s∈S p s |s s| ⊗ ρ s E , where p s is the probability that the key satisfies S = s and {|s } s∈S is a family of orthonormal vectors. Here the uniform distribution ensures that the eavesdropper is all equal probability for guessing any result, and there is no optimal guessing strategies. Being independent of Eve means Eve cannot increase the guessing probability with the help of its auxiliary systems. Robustness means that the protocol can usually generate a key, i.e., S = ⊥. Hence if a protocol both satisfies correctness, secrecy and robustness, then the protocol achieves perfect security, and we can describe the perfectly secure classical-quantum-state of S and E as However, a practical QKD protocol cannot be designed perfectly, so the perfect security definition is hard to fulfill. If a protocol is "similar" to a perfectly secure protocol, we can define the ǫ-security by indistinguishability to describe a protocol of which security is approximately the same as the ideal protocol. The requirement of ǫ-security is that a protocol should be ǫ c -correct, ǫ s -secrecy and ǫ rrobust [32] . ǫ c -correctness requires that the output keys S A and S B from Alice and Bob's side should be the same at most times expect for a very small probability ǫ c , which could be described by
The requirement of ǫ r -robustness is that the probability of a protocol which cannot generate keys is not larger than a very small value ǫ r , which means
and a protocol is ǫ s -secret if and only if the distance between the classical-quantum-state ρ SE and ρ perf ect SE is smaller than ǫ s , which could be represented by
where ρ SE is the joint state of a output key S and the auxiliary system held by Eve.
If a protocol satisfies both ǫ c -correct, ǫ s -secrecy and ǫ r -robust, then we can treat the protocol ǫ-secure, where ǫ = ǫ c + ǫ s + ǫ r .
FIG. 1. (Color online)
Schematic of the entanglement-in-themiddle CV-QKD protocol [31] . EPR: untrusted two-mode squeezed state with variance V . Hom: homodyne detection. QM: quantum memory. Only the homodye detections are discussed here and Eve's attacks are considered as two correlated modes attacks without loss of generality.
III. THE ORIGINAL CV-QKD PROTOCOL WITH ENTANGLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGAINST COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
We begin by describing the CV-QKD protocol with entanglement in the middle, which was originally proposed in Ref. [31] . A two-mode squeezed vacuum state EPR, with an unknown variance V , is prepared by the untrusted third party, see Fig. 1 . The EPR source can be created either by a untrusted communication party Charlie or by the potential adversary Eve. The two modes of an EPR source, e.g., EPR 1 and EPR 2 , are sent to Alice and Bob separately though quantum channels. As the general assumption in QKD is that both of the two quantum channels could be totally controlled by potential eavesdropper Eve; leading to the introduction of loss and noise to the states after transmission. Assuming the quadratures of the two modes of the EPR source arê X EP R1 andX EP R2 with the covariance matrix (CM)
where I = diag [1, 1] and Z = diag[1, −1], and the transmissivities of two channels are τ A and τ B respectively, then we have the quadratures after transmissions, given byX
where E 1 and E 2 are the ancillary systems which Eve inject into the links to attack the protocol. The twocorrelated-modes eavesdropping strategy is considered here, which is the general two-modes attack strategy, where the CM γ E1E2 of the two correlated modes is
where ω A and ω B are the variance of modes E 1 and E 2 , and the correlation term G = diag [g, g ′ ] with the correlation parameters g and g ′ satisfying the constraints shown in Ref. [33] . The attack is optimal by setting modes E 1 and E 2 as coherent given in Refs. [23, 34, 35] .
Originally, Alice and Bob perform quadrature measurements via homodyne or heterodyne detections, and in this paper, we only consider the scenario that both Alice and Bob employ homodyne detections to get one measurement result, i.e., quadrature x or p. After finishing the state preparation and measurement phases, both Alice and Bob announce which quadrature they choose through an authenticated pubic channel to sift their keys. They hold the data for which the selected quadratures are the same and discard the rest. Finally, the two communication parties proceed with classical data postprocessing, namely parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification to distill their keys.
In the case of collective attacks setting, the state ρ A N B N E N after all runs can be considered as a tensor product state, namely
where N is the total number of quantum signals exchanged during the protocol. In this paper, we only focus on the asymptotic case under collective attacks to show the ideal performance of the protocol, where the total number of quantum states N tends to infinite. The asymptotic secret key rate K asym collective (for reverse reconciliation) is given by the Devetak-Winter formula [36] , which reads
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I (A : B) is the classical mutual information between Alice's and Bob's data, and χ (B : E) is the Holevo information between Bob's data and the eavesdropper [37] . This is given by χ (B : E) = S (E) − S (E|B), where S (E) is the von Neumann entropy of Eve and S (E|B) is the conditional von Neumann entropy of Eve given Bob's information. χ (B : E) can be bounded with the help of the Gaussian state extramelity theorem [38, 39] in the case of collective attacks, hence we assume that the state ρ AB is Gaussian to minimize the final secret key rates, which can be calculated from the CM. A detailed derivation of the CM and the key rate can be seen in Appendix A.
IV. THE MODIFIED CV-SDI QKD PROTOCOL AGAINST GENERAL COHERENT ATTACKS
In the case of general coherent attacks, the assumption that ρ A N B N E N has tensor product structure is invalid, so we cannot apply Eq. (8) directly to bound the security key rate after finite runs of the protocol. There are in general two main security-proof techniques developed in CV-QKD to handle coherent attack issues. One method is the de Finetti theorem [40, 41] , which have the ability to reduce the security from coherent attacks to collective attacks, and it was successfully employed to analyse the protocol which has some symmetric properties [27] . The alternative is the entropic uncertainty relation [29, 30] , which requires that the protocol needs to randomly measure between two quadratures and perform the sifting process [24, 28] . We exploit the latter tool in this paper to obtain the security of the entanglement-in-the-middle protocol with homodyne-homodyne structure against coherent attacks.
We analyse the protocol under general coherent attacks with untrusted source in the middle by adapting the approach described in Ref. [30] . Thanks to the composable security framework, we have the ability to study the protocol considering some imperfect situation, such as the practical detection model, the energy test and finite-size effect, which allows us to modify the protocol in coherentattack case.
A. The practical detection model and the measurement phase
We model the practical detector as an ideal homodyne detector followed by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) with finite sampling range, and therefore the measurement process can be divided into two steps.
In Step 1, Alice and Bob exploit ideal homodyne detectors to measure the input signal with infinite ranges and resolutions. The measurement quadratures are ideal continuous variables with infinite dimensions, hence the measurement results are also continuous. Assuming that the sifting process is done, we denote the outputs of ideal homodyne detectors as Q A and Q B in two sides. In general CV-QKD scenario, the statistical distribution of each outcome should follow a Gaussian distribution.
In order to obtain a tight bound using the entropic uncertainty relation, we need to rescale one of two results, Q A or Q B , and ensure that Alice's and Bob's measurement outcomes have high correlations after transmission through untrusted channels. We use the transformations below (using Alice as an example) to scale the quadrature measurements:
where t q denotes the rescaling factor related to the channel losses of Alice and Bob, which can be determined by matching the variances of Alice's and Bob's measurement results. Supposing that m signals are randomly chosen to do the parameter estimation, the average value of quadrature measurement results both in Alice's and Bob's sides can be estimated bŷ
where
, and it is easy to estimate the parameter t q by [28] 
In the symmetric case, where the channel losses and noises of Alice and Bob are approximately the same, we can simplify the analysis by assuming that t q ≈ 1.
In
Step 2, the ADCs with finite range and finite precision followed by homodyne detectors are exploited to discretize continuous measuring intervals into discrete intervals, and the continuous variablesQ A and Q B are also discretized. The measurement results are grouped into intervals:
where α is the maximum discretization range of the ADCs, which takes the finite range of detectors into consideration, and δ denotes the resolution of the measurement, which shows how much detail the detector can detect. The corresponding outcome alphabet is denoted by χ = {1, 2, ..., 2α/δ}, where we assume 2α/δ ∈ N and every measurement outcome corresponds to one of the intervals. After this step, the continuous outcomes are replaced by the discrete results, which are denoted bỹ
This detection model can effectively illustrate the practical detector with finite range and resolution, without considering the efficiency of the detector, which could be modeled by a beam splitter with transmissivity T d [42] . However, the "discretization" process may cause security issues when compared with the ideal detection case since the detection results are missing information about the quadratures. One issue is that any measurement outcomes inside one of the equal-length intervals (−α, −α + δ] , ...., (α − δ, α] will map to the same value and it may cause a reduction in the information about the state within each sampling interval due to the finite sampling bits. This effect can be suppressed by increasing the number of sampling bits. The other problem is caused by two intervals with infinite length, namely (−∞, −α] and [α, ∞), and users cannot know the full information about the state outside the detection range. In other word, users cannot distinguish whether the energy of the measured pulse is low or high, which may leave some loopholes for eavesdropping. This problem can be solved by the energy test solution.
B. The energy test
For fear of the large energy attack that Eve may exploit during the communication process, the protocol should be modified by adding the energy test step to ensure that the energy of measured states is below a certain threshold. We adapt the energy test method proposed in Ref. [30] to study entanglement-in-the-middle protocol to remove the assumption of the source in the security analysis, which should be considered in trusted source scenario [29] , hence this protocol also can be called source-device-independent protocol. Assuming that the protocol is performed with reverse reconciliation, the energy test is exploited in Bob's side before Bob perform the measurement step, which is described in Fig. 2 . Bob use a beam splitter with almost perfect transmissivity T to split incoming mode X B into two parts, and a is the vacuum mode introduced by the other port of the beam splitter. Mode X ′ B is the transmitted mode of the output used for generating Bob's raw data using a homodyne detector, and a ′ is the reflected mode for the energy test. The reflected mode a ′ is measured by a heterodyne detector, which consists of a balanced beam splitter and two homodyne detectors. Modes t 1 and t 2 are the output modes of the balanced beam splitter used for checking whether the amplitude of one output |q t1 | and the phase of the other output |p t2 | are below a certain threshold. If for every measured signal, both the amplitude |q t1 | and the phase |p t2 | are not larger than the threshold M th , we say that the energy test passes; and the protocol aborts otherwise. The probability that Bob measures with homodyne detection larger than the detection range α can be bounded by the function Γ (α, T, M th ), which reads [30] Γ(α, T, M th ) :
where µ = 
C. Finite-size effect and the key rate
In the coherent-attack scenario, due to the leftover hash lemma, the ǫ c -correct and ǫ s -secret key of length ℓ sec can be extracted [43] , which can be expressed by (16) where ℓ EC denotes the leaked information in error correction step, and it can be estimated before the error correction begin during the parameter estimation phase, H with smoothing parameter ǫ, conditioned on the information Eve may have, which quantifies Eve's uncertainty about the Alice's measurement outcomes. ǫ satisfies ǫ ≤ (ǫ s − ǫ 1 )/2p pass − 2ǫ, whereǫ is the security parameter related to the energy test given in Eq. (15) and we choose ǫ 1 = ǫ s /2 for simplification [44] . Equation (16) is a CV type key formula considering the quantum side information E in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [29] .
The parameter ℓ EC can be easily obtained by publishing some of Bob's data (in the reverse reconciliation case), which is
where H (X B ) denotes the discrete Shannon entropy of the data in Bob side, which can be described by
and I (X B : X A ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob. Our target is to bound the smooth min-entropy H ǫ min X key B |E in the presence of quantum adversaries. The entropic uncertainty relations were originally introduced in discrete variable QKD to bound the min-entropy and to show the protocols' security [45, 46] . They were thereafter extended to infinite dimensions by Furrer et al. [47, 48] . Therefore we exploit one type of uncertainty relation formula shown in Ref. [30] to bound the min-entropy in the entanglement-in-the-middle protocol, and the feature of the entropic uncertainty relation together with the energy test, resulting in the protocols being source-device-independent.
Entropic uncertainty relation gives a bound of guessing the uncertainty that the eavesdropper may have, when both communication parties randomly measure in two bases. The relationship between smooth min-and maxentropies is given by
where c (δ) quantifies the overlap of the two measurements and is independent of the measured states, which considers the detectors' discretization process and has the form:
where S
0 is the 0 th radial prolate spheroidal wave function of the first kind [49] , which can be well approximated by c (δ) ≈ δ 2 (2π) if the interval length δ is not large. 
and we need to bound the correlation between data X key B
and X key A . For that we exploit the average distance,
to give the bound of the smooth max-entropy. It has been shown in Ref. [29] 
hold, we can always give a bound by
where γ is a function arising from a large deviation consideration, which reads
However, we have only data X pe A and X pe B with m length to perform the parameter estimation rather than data X key A and X key B , thus parameter d needs to be bounded by exploiting the data only consumed in parameter estimation step. Two functions need to be defined first, one is the average second moment of the difference between two sequences, which reads
and the other is the average second moment for the discretized data measurements, which is denoted by
Then we check whether the average distance With the help of Serfling's large deviation bound [51] , we can finally bound the max-entropy by , which denotes
with
and
ν is the smallest real number making ξ positive. If there exist ν such that ξ is positive and ǫ 1 −2 2Γ (α, T, M th ) < ǫ s is satisfied, the final secret key rate under coherent attacks can be written as
where ℓ Low is the lower bound of the secure key length, which reads
(32) Otherwise, we denote that the key rate K coherent = 0. The detailed proof of this section can be seen in Ref. [30] .
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
Using the results in the previous section, we can plot the secret key rate as a function of the total transmission distance focusing on the symmetric configuration where we set τ A = τ B = √ T and T is the transmissivity of the channel. The simulations are under two-mode optimal attacks to show the performance of the protocol and both collective and coherent attack scenarios are discussed shown in Fig. 3 .
In order to facilitate the analysis of the performance of the protocol, we simulate the key rate with some ideal parameters. For instance, we assume that the protocol has an ideal modulation variance V = 10 5 (which could replace an infinite modulation variance) and perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1. Also, to get the lower bound of the protocol, we set g = min (ω A − 1) (ω B + 1), (ω A + 1) (ω B − 1) and ω A = ω B = 1+T ξ/(1 − T ) with excess noise ξ in one channel for two-mode optimal attacks. In the coherent attack cases, we set the interval parameter α to 52 [29] and the overall security parameter is smaller than 10 −20 . Meanwhile, the parameter M th is set to 12 to ensure that the energy test fails with probability smaller than 10 −20 .
In Fig. 3 , the gray dot line shows the PirandolaLaurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [52] , which gives an upper bound of the secret key capacity of the lossy channel. The black solid line is the asymptotic key rate under collective attacks, and the longest transmission distance is over 18km, which is a little shorter than that of the two-mode individual attacks case (where the correlation parameter g = 0) [31] . The other five curves, from top to bottom, describe the key rates under coherent attacks. The red solid curve is obtained for N → ∞, and the other dashed lines describe the rate for N = 10 10 to N = 10 7 with finite exchanged signals. In Fig. 4 , we also plot the secret key rate under coherent attacks as a function of block size for different distances. The distances are 5km, 10km and 14km, respectively. We point out that when the block size reduces, the secret key rate decreases, and it is not achievable if the block size is below 10 7 .
We notice that there is a gap between the performance of CV-QKD protocol with entanglement in the middle under collective attacks and that under asymptotic coherent attacks cases. The reason is that the bound given by the entropic uncertainty relation is not very tight especially in the high losses regime, which has been shown in Ref. [30] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have analyzed the security of continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol against general coherent attacks, where the source of the protocol is untrusted and may be controlled by the malicious adversary. By exploiting the state-independent entropic uncertainty relation together with the energy test, our analysis has no assumptions on the source, making the protocol sourcedevice-independent even under coherent attacks. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security framework, the protocol is still secure, achieving high key rates against coherent attacks under the condition of achievable block lengths (N from 10 7 to 10 10 ). 
